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I. INTRODUCTION

The notion of liberative prescription was developed to prevent a
plaintiff from bringing suit years after the accrual of his cause of
action for damages, when evidence was likely to have been lost and
witnesses likely to have disappeared, making it difficult or impossible
to defend against the suit. To prevent this occurrence, time limits
were set within which a plaintiff was required to file suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction. Failure to do so resulted in the prescription
of the plaintiff's cause ofaction. However, once a plaintiff filed suit,
he was not required to prosecute his suit to judgment, thus making
suits imprescriptable. Therefore, the notion of abandonment of
actions was developed to prevent plaintiffs from filing suit and then
leaving the suit to languish indefinitely over the defendants' heads.
The principle of abandonment was conceived as a form of
liberative prescription. Originally, a plaintiff was penalized only for
failing to timely file suit by the threat of liberative prescription.
Later, he was also penalized for failing to timely prosecute his suit to
judgment once it had been filed by the threat of abandonment. Like
the doctrine of liberative prescription, the doctrine of abandonment
has given rise to its fair share of litigation and the creation ofparallel
jurisprudential exceptions.
Throughout its history, the doctrine of abandonment has evolved
and grown. Abandonment initially applied to plaintiffs but has been
expanded to apply to all parties. Its time period has been shortened
from five to three years. The doctrine has also developed into a fairly
complex set of rules and requirements; as a result, abandonment is
truly an evolving concept of liberative prescription.
II. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF ABANDONMENT

A. LouisianaCivil Code Roots
Modem Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 561 finds its
roots in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, within the articles on
liberative prescription. In 1870, it was "an established rule that the
mere filing of suit placed an action within the hallowed realm of
Former Louisiana Civil Code article 3519
imprescriptability."
(1870) was drafted to limit the effect ofArticle 3518, which provided
for the interruption ofprescription by the filing of suit.
Article 3519 (1870) stated: "If the plaintiff in this case, after
having made his demand, abandons or discontinues it, the interruption
1. Roger H. Doyle, The Abandonment ofSuit-Its Effect on Prescription,22
Tul. L. Rev. 504 (1948).
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shall be considered as never having happened.",2 The article's
purpose was to nullify the effect of Article 3518 when the plaintiff
voluntarily abandoned his suit; thus, interruption of prescription was
considered never to have occurred. However, even with article 3519
in place, the plaintiff was under no duty to prosecute his case once it
had been filed, subjecting the defendant to harassment by a suit which
would not otherwise prescribe or be prosecuted to judgment.3
Article 3519 was amended in 1898 to include a second
paragraph:4
Whenever the plaintiff having made his demand shall at any
time before obtaining final judgment allow five years to
elapse without having taken any steps in the prosecution
thereof,
he shall be considered as having abandoned the
5
same.
This provision was added to end the unfairness defendants faced by
having a suit pending indefinitely against them when plaintiffs failed
to prosecute.
The abandonment article is a species of liberative prescription.
However, abandonment is separate and distinct from the prescription
of the substantive claim itself.6 Prescription of a claim differs from
prescription of the suit based on abandonment. Additionally, the
means by which the prescriptive periods may be interrupted are also
different. The prescriptive period for a claim begins to run from the
time the action accrues and is interrupted by the filing of suit in a
court of competent jurisdiction. The abandonment period begins to
run from the time suit is filed and is interrupted each time a party
takes a formal step toward the prosecution or defense of his case
within the abandonment period, from the last step taken by any party.7
If the plaintiff abandons his suit, the interruption of prescription
is considered never to have occurred, and the effect is to put the
plaintiff in the same position he would be in had he never filed suit.'
2. La. Civ. Code art. 3519 (1870).
3. See Doyle, 22 Tul. L. Rev. at 505 (1948).
4. The second paragraph ofArticle 3519 was derived from Article 397 of the
Fiench Code of Procedure. Article 397 provided for the extinguishment of a suit
in three years by failure to prosecute the suit for that period of time. See Doyle, 22
Tul. L. Rev. at 505, citing Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code 1906-1907, at 146
(1925). Article 397 served to effectuate the method in Article 2247 of the Code
Napoleon which provided that interruption was considered never to have occurred
where a demand for dismissal was made. Id. Doyle, 22 Tul. L. Rev. at 505 n. 4.
5. La. Civ. Code art. 3519 (1870), as amended by 1898 La. Acts 107.
6. Melancon v. Continental Gas Co., 307 So. 2d 308, 311 (La. 1975).
7. Id.at3lO,313n.1.
8. Id. at 313 n.1. See also Charbonnet v. State Realty Co., 155 La. 1044,
1049, 99 So. 865, 867 (1923).
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Therefore, where a suit has abandoned for failure to prosecute, a
separate determination of whether the substantive claim has also
prescribed must be made." It is possible that a suit may have
abandoned and, yet, the substantive claim has not prescribed,
especially where the prescriptive period for the cause of action is
greater than the abandonment period.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the 1898 amendment to
Article 3519 provided a method of abandonment of a suit by failure
to prosecute for five years.' ° Although the language of the amended
article did not set forth the legal effects ofabandonment for failure to
prosecute, the courts construed the amendment as adopting the
provisions in the first paragraph. Thus, abandonment for failure to
prosecute had the same effect on prescription as voluntary dismissal
-it was as if the interruption of prescription had never occurred."
In Reagan v. Louisiana Western Railroad,2 the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that Article 3519 did not apply to appeals,
attempting to limit the application of Article 3519 to suits in the
courts of original jurisdiction. 13 The attempt proved to be
unsuccessful, since the appeal was filed by the defendant and Article
3519 applied only to plaintiffs. 4 In subsequent cases where the
plaintiff filed the appeal, courts did not feel constrained to follow
Reaganand dismissed appeals under Article 3519.15 Finally, in 1932,
the issue was settled when the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Verrett
v. Savoie,
6 held that Article 3519 did not apply to cases pending on
appeal.'
The application of the abandonment article to a case involving an
appeal was again questioned in a recent case. In James v. Formosa
Plastics Corporationof Louisiana, the Louisiana Supreme Court
addressed whether an action against one defendant remaining in the
trial court could abandon while the judgment dismissing the
plaintiff s action against another defendant was pending on appeal. '7
9. Melancon,307 So. 2dat3ll n.1.
10. Lockhart v. Lockhart, 113 La. 872, 37 So. 860 (1905).
11. Doyle, 22 Tul. L. Rev. at 506; Teutonia Loan &Bldg. Co. v. Connolly, 133
La. 401, 63 So. 63 (1913).
12. Reagan v. Louisiana Western R. Co., 143 La. 754, 79 So. 328 (1918).
13. Id. at 329.
14. Id.The court refused to treat the appellant-defendant as the plaintiff, or to
transform a defendant into a plaintiff on appeal.
15. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Zimmerman & Sons, 167 La. 751, 120 So.
283 (1929); Eichelberger v. B&T Const. Co., 173 La. 400, 137 So. 194 (1931);
Mouton v. Morganis Louisiana & Texas Railroad & Steamship Co., 5 La. App. 745
(1927); Good v. Picone, 18 La. App. 42, 137 So. 870 (Orl. 1931).
16. Verrett v. Savoie, 174 La. 844, 141 So. 854 (1932).
17. James v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 01-2056 (La. 4/3/02), 813 So. 2d 335.
That case is discussed in depth at Section VI.
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The cdurt held that the plaintiffs suit against the defendant, who
remained subject to the trial court's jurisdiction, could abandon."
Article 3519 applied only to plaintiffs. As noted by one court:
It will be observed that this language [in Civil Code Article
3519] plainly provides that only the plaintiff shall be
considered as having abandoned the case .... The evident
purpose and intention of the Legislature was to penalize a
plaintiff in a suit for failure to take any steps in the
prosecution of it for a period of five years. The law does not
place any penalty upon any other party litigant except the
plaintiff.
The defendant's filing an answer could not be deemed a step in the
prosecution of the action by the plaintiff to prevent abandonment.2"
Yet, in another Louisiana Supreme Court case, the court held that the
defendant's filing ofan answer in a case "ripe for default" to prevent
the default under a stress of necessity created by the plaintiff was a
step taken by the plaintiff to prevent dismissal for abandonment.2 '
The plaintiffs thereafter moved to set the case for trial. 2
Article 3519's application only to plaintiffs-and not to
defendants-gave rise to litigation over which party was the
plaintiff.23 For example, a defendant-in-reconvention did not become
a plaintiff for purposes of Article 3519.24 However, when Article
3519 was transferred to the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure in
1960, the application of the article was broadened to include
defendants.
Much of the litigation involving Article 3519 concerned a
determination of what constituted an action sufficient to avoid
abandonment. 5 The requirement that the plaintiff take a formal step
in the trial court gave effect to the legislative intent that there be
certainty in determining when a suit had abandoned. 6 Article 3519
18. James, 01-2056 (La. 4/3/02), 813 So. 2d at 341.
19. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. J.M. Dresser Co., 131 So. 752, 14 La. App.
555 (1930) (holding that a cause of action to have fees assessed as costs by an
accountant who had been appointed by the court as an expert did not abandon in
five years).
20. Lips v. Royal Ins. Co., 149 La. 359, 89 So. 213 (1921).
21. Schutzman v. Dobrowolski, 191 La. 791,796, 186 So. 338, 340 (1939).
22. Id.
23. Hibernia Bank &Trust Co. v. J.M. Dresser Co., Ltd., 14 La. App. 555, 131
So. 752 (1930).
24. Carmody v. Land, 207 La. 625, 635, 21 So. 2d 764, 767 (1945).
25. Likewise, much of the litigation involving our modem version ofLa. Code
Civ. P. art. 561 concerns what constitutes a step in prosecution to interrupt the
abandonment period.
26. Sliman v. Araguel, 196 La. 859, 863, 200 So. 280, 281 (1941).
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required "some active measure taken by plaintiff, intended and
calculated to hasten the suit to judgment.""L Neither an opposing
defendant's motion to dismiss nor the filing a supplemental petition
to substitute another party for the plaintiff was sufficient to avoid
abandonment.2" Additionally, a motion to withdraw the record was
for the convenience of counsel and not a step in prosecuting the case
and was not sufficient to prevent abandonment.29 Conferences
between counsel were not formal steps taken in the court and would
not prevent abandonment. 3' An action taken by a non-party did not
save a suit from abandonment.3 Likewise, the issuance of citations
by the clerk and service by~the sheriff were not adequate steps taken
by the plaintiff to preclude abandonment.32
A plaintiffs inaction could be excused if he showed that his
failure to prosecute the case was due to circumstances beyond his
control. 33 Furthermore, Article 3519 did not apply where the court
failed to take action after the case had been submitted for trial.34
However, an act or failure to act by another person did not excuse the
plaintiff's failure to take a step toward the prosecution of his case.35
For example, where a case was never submitted because a clerk failed
to file the transcript of testimony, the plaintiff was charged with the
failure to act, and the case abandoned. Similarly, although a trial
record did not exist, where the clerk failed to notify the plaintiff ofthe
disposition of his motion and the plaintiff failed to find the record of
the disposition in the minutes, the plaintiff had3 no excuse for his
failure to prosecute. 37 Thus, his suit abandoned. 1
Louisiana courts have stated that a plaintiff's failure to prosecute
his case for a period of five years resulted in automatic
abandonment.39 In Sandifield Oil & Gas Company v. Paul, a
Louisiana appellate court further stated that the defendant did not
waive his right to seek dismissal for the plaintiff s failure to prosecute

27.

Augusta Sugar Co. v. Haley, 163 La. 814, 816, 112 So. 731, 732 (1927).

28. Id.

29. Lips v. Royal Ins. Co., 149 La. 359, 89 So. 213 (1921).
30. Sliman, 196 La. 859, 860, 200 So. 280, 281 (1941), citing State ex rel.
Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. R. v. Edrington, 11 Orl. App. 288 (La. 1914).
31. Seligman v. G. A. Scott& Bro., 17 La. App. 486, 488, 134 So. 771, 772
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).

32. Id.

33. Jones v. Phelps, 95-0607 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/95), 665 So. 2d 30.
34. Barton v. Burbank, 138 La. 997, 71 So. 134 (1916).
35. Barton v. Burbank, 114 La. 224, 38 So. 2d 150 (1905).

36. Id.
37.

Bell v. Staring, 170 So. 502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).

39.

Evans v. Hanner, 209 La. 442, 24 So. 2d 814 (1946).

38. Id.
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when he took no action himself" Abandonment was self-operative;
thus, the defendant was not reuired to file a motion to dismiss for the
abandonment to be effective.
Since Article 3519 applied only to plaintiffs, the filing of an
answer or other pleading by a defendant priorto the accrualof the
five year abandonment period did not constitute a waiver to prevent
abandonment for the plaintiff's failure to prosecute. However, a
defendant could waive abandonment bytaking an action inconsistent
with the intent to consider the suit abandoned afterthe plaintiff failed
to take a step for five years. Therefore, the defendant's filing of an
answer after the accrual of the abandonment period waived
abandonment,42 even where the answer was combined with a motion
Similarly, asserting prescription coupled with
to dismiss. 4
abandonment as affirmative defenses constituted a waiver of
abandonment. 44
Unfortunately, the incorporation of the second paragraph of
Article 3519 regarding abandonment for failure to prosecute did not
entirely solve the problem of inprescriptability once a suit was filed.
A plaintiff could merely take some action every five years to prevent
abandonment. Thus, for practical purposes, the suit continued
indefinitely and the defendant would be "saddled with the burden of
' Recommendations that
carrying forward an action against himself."45
the five year abandonment period should be shortened were made as
early as 1948. The time period was finally reduced from five to three
years in 1997-49 years after that recommendation was first made.46
B. Transferto Louisiana Code of CivilProcedure
Article 3519 saw no further changes after its amendment in 1898
until 1960, when the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure was adopted.
Article 3519 was incorporated into the new Code of Civil Procedure
as Article 561. 47 The new Article 561 incorporated the courts'
interpretation of "a step in the prosecution of the case" to mean "a
40. Sandifield Oil & Gas Co. v. Paul, 7 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
41. Id.
42. Geisenberger v. Cotton, 116 La. 651, 40 So. 929 (1906).
43. King v. Illinois Central R.R., 143 So. 95 (La. App. Orl.1932).
44. Continental SupplyCo. v. Fisher Oil Co., 156 La. 101,105, 100 So. 64, 66
(1924); Doyle, 22 Tul. L. Rev. 504, 511 n.52 (stating this was a "hard" decision
based on a highly technical point).
45. Doyle, 22 Tul. L. Rev. at 512.
46. Article 397 ofthe French Code of Civil Procedure on which article 3519
was modeled incorporated a three year abandonment period. Doyle, 22 Tul. L. Rev.
at 505.
47. See 1960 La. Acts No. 30 § 1, transferring La. Civ. Code art. 3519 (1870)
to La. Code Civ. P. art. 561 (1960).
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formal action taken before the court intended to hasten the suit to
judgment."4' It also expanded the application ofthe article to include
all parties. The intent to make the abandonment article applicable to
steps taken by defendant is replicated in the language expanding a
"step" to include one taken in the prosecution or the defense of the
case.
In the controversial case of DeClouet v. Kansas City Southern
Railway, decided after the inception of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the plaintiff's suit was dismissed on grounds of abandonment for
failure to take a formal action intended to hasten the suit to judgment
before the court.49 The plaintiff took the depositions of the
defendant's engineer, fireman and other employees, pursuant to
Article 1421 of the Code of Civil Procedure, four years after filing
suit. At the end ofthe fifth year, the defendant moved to have the suit
dismissed on grounds of abandonment. The trial court dismissed the
suit. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the taking of discovery
depositions under stipulation by the parties, but without filing formal
motions in court, did not constitute a formal step sufficient to defeat
abandonment. 50
Prior to 1952, depositions taken by the plaintiff would have
constituted formal steps in the prosecution since depositions and
written discovery requests had to be executed under court order.5
Therefore, with the jurisprudential rule in place interpreting a step in
the prosecution to mean "a formal action before the court", the takin
of a deposition was necessarily a formal step before the court.
However, the Depositions and Discovery Act of 1952 relieved the
trial court of the burden of issuing court orders for depositions and
written discovery requests. Consequently, the taking of a deposition
was no longer a "formal action" before the court. 53 The DeClouet
court refused to consider steps taken outside the court record because
of the uncertainties posed by informal moves.54
In his dissent of the denial of the application for rehearing in
DeClouet,Judge Tate argued that there was no need for formal action
before the court where the plaintiff's conduct was active and known

48. Richard A. Tonry, CivilProcedure-AbandonmentofSuit, 26 La. L. Rev.
719 (1966).
49. DeClouet v. Kansas City Southern Railway, 176 So. 2d 471,473 (La. App.
3d Cir.), writ refused, 178 So. 2d 662 (La. 1965).

50. Id.
51.

Tonry,26La.L.Rev.at721.

52.

Jimmy L. Dauzat, PleadingsandPractice-AbandonmentofSuit-Taking

Discovery Depositionsas Steps in the Process,40 Tul. L. Rev. 431 (1966).

53. Id.

54. DeClouet, 176 So. 2d at 476.
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to the defendant." Judge Tate criticized the majority for failing to
realize an important objective of the redactors of the new Code-to
eliminate many unnecessary technical rules which served to defeat
justice.56
After the DeClouetdecision in 1965, the Reporters on the Code
of Civil Procedure project proposed an amendment to Article 561. 57
The proposed amendment would have included, in addition to taking
a formal step in the trial court, the taking of a deposition or the use of
any of the authorized discovery devices as methods by which the
plaintiff could prevent abandonment.5" The Reporter's Advisory
Committee gave a qualified approval of the proposed legislative
overruling ofDeClouetand also recommended that the abandonment
period be shortened from five to three years. The Council of Law
reaffirmed the five year abandonment period and decided against the
proposed amendment to Article 561."' However, both of these
recommendations were eventually incorporated into Article 561 in
1997.
C. Expansion ofApplication
Former Article 3519 applied only to plaintiffs. However, when
Article 3519 was transferred to the new Code of Civil Procedure as
Article 561, it was expanded to apply to both plaintiffs and
defendants. Article 561 (1960) expressly stated that a step by either
party within five years from the last step taken would interrupt the
abandonment period."
In cases involving multiple defendants, certain questions were
repeatedly presented to Louisiana courts. The questions included
55. Id.
56. Dauzat, 40 Tul. L. Rev. at 436, n.34, citing Henry G. McMahon, The
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,21 La. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1960).
57. Tonry, 26 La. L. Rev. at 723.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Article 561 (1960), as amended by 1966 La. Acts No. 36 § 1,provided in
pertinent part:
An action is abandoned when the parties fail to take any steps in its
prosecution or defense in the trial court for a period of five years. This
provision shall be operative without formal order, but on ex parte motion
of any party or other interested person, the trial court shall enter a formal
order of dismissal as ofthe date ofits abandonment.
By this language, the article makes clear that an action is abandoned if five years
elapse without a step taken by any party-plaintiff(s) or defendant(s). The change
provides for the case where the defendant takes a step in the defense of the action
and then attempts to have the suit declared abandoned for the plaintiff's failure to
take any step toward prosecution in five years. See Melancon, 307 So. 2d at 313
n.3.
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whether the plaintiff was required to take a step in the prosecution of
his action against each defendant to prevent abandonment of his
cause of action against that defendant; whether a step taken in the
prosecution or defense by any party would interrupt abandonment as
to all parties; and whether steps taken would be effective against
unserved defendants.
In Bolden v. Brazile, the plaintiffs filed suit to be declared the
owners of immovable property and sought damages for the value of
oil, gas and other minerals removed from the property.6 The
plaintiffs sued the Texas Company (now Texaco Inc.) and twelve
individuals who claimed to be the owners of the property and who
had contracted with Texaco for oil and gas production. The plaintiffs
never effected service on the twelve individual plaintiffs. Texaco, on
its own behalf and on behalf of the twelve individual defendants,
eventually filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' suit on grounds of
abandonment. The trial court dismissed the suit against allparties
and the plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court affirmed.' The
appellate court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that Texaco had no
right to file the motion to dismiss on behalf of the twelve individual
defendants, finding that Texaco was an interested party entitled to file
a motion to dismiss on behalf of all defendants pursuant to Article
561.63
The appellate court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that Texaco
and the twelve individual defendants were solidary obligors and
decided that prescription was, therefore, not interrupted against all by
an action taken against one party.' The court based its conclusion on
the fact that the plaintiffs took no step in the prosecution of their case
against the individual defendants during the abandonment period,
rather than on the fact that individual defendants had never been
served.65
Interestingly, the appellate court found that the plaintiffs' filing
of a motion to fix exceptions for trial was a step in the prosecution
which interrupted abandonment as to Texaco."6 However, the court
determined that the twelve individuals were indispensable parties
who could not be brought back into the suit by amendment of the
pleadings.67 On that ground, the court dismissed the suit against
Texaco for failure to include indispensable parties.6 s
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Bolden v. Brazile, 172 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Bolden, 172 So. 2dat3lO.
Id.
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The holding in Bolden v. Brazilewas rejected in Sprowlv. Woh1 9
some twenty-six years later. In Sprowl, the fourth circuit interpreted
the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Delta Development
Company, Inc. v. Jurgens70 as overruling the premise that an action
taken against one defendant did not interrupt the abandonment period
as to other defendants. 7 The DeltaDevelopment Court held that the
abandonment period was interrupted as to all defendants by
interrogatories served on one defendant, even though the defendants
were not solidary obligors.72 Based on this decision, the fourth circuit
held in Sprowl that an action taken against one defendant interrupted
the abandonment period as to all defendants, without noting a
distinction between served and unserved defendants.73
The Sprowl court also relied upon Bissett v. Allstate Insurance
Company,74 where the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' action on grounds of abandonment and
adopted Judge Shortress' dissenting opinion in the lower court. 75 In
Bissett, the plaintiffs deposed a defendant who had not yet been
The defendant participated in the deposition with
served.
representation by counsel. Although noting that participation in the
deposition would not constitute a general appearance under Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 7, the court held that the deposition
was a step in the prosecution of the lawsuit.76 In his dissenting
opinion in Bissett, Judge Shortress of the First Circuit found that the
ruling in Delta Development Company v. Jurgens applied, and the
plaintiffs action against the unserved defendant who was deposed
should not have abandoned.77
Judge Shortress found the facts in Bissett to be similar to those in
the case ofLandry v. Thomas.78 In Landry,a defendant, who had not
been served with process in the lawsuit, was served with notice of a
motion to take his deposition just before the abandonment period had
run. In Landry, the fourth circuit held that the abandonment period
had been interrupted by the motion to depose the unserved
defendant.79 The fourth circuit also distinguished Landry from its
69. 576 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writdenied,580 So. 2d 928 (La. 1991).
70. Delta Dev. Co., Inc. v. Jurgens, 456 So. 2d 145 (La. 1984).
71. Sprowl, 576 So. 2d at 639.
72. Delta Dev. Co.,576 So. 2d at 146.

73. Sprowl, 576 So. 2d at 639.

74. Bissett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 567 So. 2d 598 (La. 1990).
75. See Bissett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 So. 2d 884, 887 (La. App. 1st Cir.

1990).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 887.

78. Landry v. Thomas, 422 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), writ denied,
429 So. 2d 143 (1983).
79. Id.
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earlier holding in Bolden v. Brazile, stating that Bolden was based
upon the failure to take any step against the unserved defendants.8 0
The failure to serve the defendants was not the dispositive fact."
However, there is some disagreement among the circuit courts as
to whether interruption ofabandonment is effective against unserved
defendants. For example, in Bridges v. Wilcoxon, 2 the Second
Circuit held that an action taken by or against a plaintiff or served
defendants did not interrupt the abandonment period as to unserved
defendants.8 3
The Second Circuit outlined the jurisprudential rules regarding
interruption of abandonment by steps taken against served and
unserved defendants:84
1) If all defendants are served, steps taken by or against any
defendant will interrupt the abandonment period as to all
defendants.85
2) If steps in the prosecution are taken against an unserved
defendant, the abandonment period is interrupted as to
that defendant and all served defendants.8 6
3) Even though steps are taken by or against a served
defendant, if no steps in the prosecution are timely taken
against an unserved defendant, the abandonment
8 7 period is
not interrupted as to the unserved defendant.
The Fourth Circuit relied on Delta Development Company, Inc.
v. Jurgensto reach its decision in Sprowl v. Wohl and to formulate the
rule in that circuit that no distinction would be made between served
and unserved defendants for purposes of interruption of the
abandonment period.8 8 However, as pointed out by the Second
80. Id.
81. Bissett,560 So. 2d at 886.
82. Bridges v. Wilcoxon, 34,660 (La. App. 2d Cir. 5/09/01),786 So. 2d 264.
83. See also Murphy v. Hurdle Planting &Livestock, Inc., 331 So. 2d 566,568
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); McClure v. A. Wilbert's Sons Lumber & Shingle Co., 232
So. 2d 879, 884 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); but see Sprowl v. Wohl, 576 So. 2d 638
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
84. Bridges v. Wilcoxin, 786 So. 2d at 268.
85. Delta Development Company, Inc. v. Jurgens, 456 So. 2d 145 (La. 1984).
86. Bissett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 567 So. 2d 598 (La. 1990); Landry v. Thomas,
422 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) writdenied,429 So. 2d 143 (La. 1983).
87. Murphy v. Hurdle Planting & Livestock, Inc., 331 So. 2d 556 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1976), writdenied, 334 So. 2d 434 (La. 1976); McClure v. A. Wilbert's Sons
Lumber & Shingle Co., 232 So 2d 879 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Bolden v. Brazile,
172 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965; Wicker v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 418 So.
2d 1378 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982), writdenied,423 So. 2d 1148 (La. 1982).
88. Bridges v. Wilcoxin, 786 So. 2d at 269 n. 3.
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Circuit, all defendants in Delta Development Company, Inc. v.
Jurgens had been served with process so the issue of unserved
defendants was not presented in that case. Therefore, the rule
announced by the Fourth Circuit, while in accord with Bissett v.
Allstate Insurance Company (an action against an unserved
defendant interrupted abandonment as to that defendant and all
served defendants), failed to recognize the distinction made between
unserved and served defendants.
The Second Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Berg Mechanical
Industries is an aberration and is contrary to the long line of cases
holding that a step intended to interrupt abandonment must be taken
in the trial court where the action is filed.9° In Johnson, the
appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal for abandonment,
making clear that its ruling was limited to the peculiar facts of the
case. 9 ' The plaintiff took nine depositions which were noticed only
in his state workers' compensation proceeding but were not crossnoticed in his concurrent state court tort suit. Counsel for the
defendants in the tort suit, who were not parties to the workers'
compensation proceeding, attended but did not participate in the
depositions. Subsequently, the defendants sought to have the state
court suit dismissed for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff opposed
the motion, arguing that he did not know that his attorney had failed
to cross-notice the depositions in the state court proceeding and that
he did not intend to abandon that action. 92
The Second Circuit cited Article 56 I's language that the taking
of a deposition, with or without formal notice, was a step in the
prosecution or defense of the action. 93 The appellate court stated
that the defendants were careful to attend the depositions in the
workers' compensation proceeding and to reserve their rights to
depose the witnesses in the state court proceeding.94 The court
reasoned that the defendants would not have attended the workers'
compensation deposition had they considered the tort suit
abandoned. 95 Thus, the Second Circuit found that the depositions
taken in a workers' compensation proceeding, attended for
monitoring purposes only by the nonparties to that proceeding, were
96
steps in the prosecution or defense of the state court tort suit.
89.
90.
So. 2d
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Johnson v. Berg Mech. Indus., 35,290 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 12/19/01), 803
1067, writ denied, 02-0240 (La. 4/26/02), 814 So. 2d 556.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 803 So. 2d 1067, 1073.
Id.
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Hence, the abandonment period was interrupted and the state court
tort suit was not abandoned. 97

IlI. MODERN VERSION OF ARTICLE 561
The current version of Article 5619' provides:
A. (1) An action is abandoned when the parties fail to take
any step in its prosecution or defense in the trial court for a
period of three years, unless it is a succession proceeding:
(a) Which has been opened.
(b) In which an administrator or executor has been
appointed.
(c) In which a testament has been probated.
(2) This provision shall be operative without formal
order, but, on ex parte motion of any party or other
interested person by affidavit which provides that no step
has been taken for a period of three years in the prosecution
or defense of the action, the trial court shall enter a formal
order of dismissal as of the date of its abandonment. The
order shall be served on the plaintiff pursuant to Article
1313 or 1314, and the plaintiff shall have thirty days from
the date of service to move to set aside the dismissal.
However, the trial court may direct that a contradictory
hearing be held prior to dismissal.
B. Any formal discovery as authorized by this Code and
served on all parties whether or not filed of record, including
the taking of a deposition with or without formal notice,
shall be deemed to be a step in the prosecution or defense of
an action.
97. Id.
98. Article 561 was amended in 1997 to reduce the abandonment period from

five to three years. The amendment became effective on July 1, 1998 and applied
to all actions pending on that date. See 1997 La. Acts No. 1221, § 2. The
amendment applies retroactively. See Bourgeois v. Veal, 99-0786 (La. 5/07/99),

740 So. 2d 1291; Theisges v. Boudreaux, 99-1458 (La. 7/2/99), 747 So. 2d 4;
Dempster v. Louisiana Health Servs. Indem. Co., 98-1112 (La. App. 5th Cir.
3/10/99), 730 So. 2d 524, reh 'gdenied,writ denied,99-1319 (La. 7/2/99), 747 So.

2d 20; Naussbaum v. McKee, 99-171 (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/19/99), 735 So. 2d 930,
writ denied, 99-1778 (La. 10/1/99), 748 So. 2d 448; Coe v. State, Health Care
Authority, 32,635 (La. App. 2d Cir.2000), 751 So. 2d 432; and Matthews v.
Fontenot, 99-0484 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999), 745 So. 2d 691.
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C. An appeal is abandoned when the parties fail to take any
step in its prosecution or disposition for the period provided
in the rules of the appellate court. 99
The statute's express language requires three things of
the plaintiff:
1. The plaintiff must take some step in the prosecution
of his lawsuit;
2. The step must be taken in the trial court;
3.

The step must be taken within the abandonment
period0 0from the time of the last step taken by any
party'

Much of the litigation arising under Code ofCivil Procedure Article
561 regards whether a party has taken a step in the prosecution or
defense of a suit within the time required to prevent abandonment.
Those actions that constituted a formal step sufficient to interrupt
abandonment under the original Civil Code article 3519 generally
survived the transition to Code of Civil Procedure article 561. A
party takes a step in the prosecution or defense of the suit by taking
a formal action before the court and on the record, which is intended
to hasten the matter to judgment.'O'
Similarly, those actions which were deemed not to be steps in
the prosecution before the transition are still insufficient after the
transfer. However, there was one major change rendered by the
transfer. Article 561 applied to both plaintiffs and defendants,
01 2
whereas former Article 3519 applied only to plaintiffs.
Therefore, after the transfer, the abandonment article did not specify
which party had to take a step in the suit's prosecution or defense.0 3
99. La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 561.
100. Melancon v. Continental Cas. Co., 307 So. 2d 308, 310 (La. 1975). Some
of the dicta in Melancon was later rejected in Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 00-3010 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So. 2d 779.
101. Bridges v. Wilcoxon, 34,660 (La. App. 2d Cir. 5/09/01),786 So. 2d 264;
Chevron Oil Co. v. Traigle, 436 So. 2d 530, 532 (La. 1983); Jones v. American
Bank & Trust Co., 175 La. 160, 167, 143 So. 35, 37 (1932); State ex rel. Yazoo &
Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Edrington, 11 Teiss. 288 (La. App. 1914).
102. See Augusta Sugar Co. v. Haley, 163 La. 814, 816, 112 So. 73, 7321 (La.
1927) (A step in the prosecution of the suit sufficient to avoid abandonment means
active measures taken by plaintiffto hasten judgment.).
103. Jones v. Phelps, 95-0607 p.4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/9/95), 665 So. 2d 30, 33,
writ denied,95-2907 (La. 2/2/96), 666 So. 2d 1104.
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Louisiana courts have held that steps taken by a plaintiff after the
suit has abandoned are without effect."° For example, a plaintiff's
amendment of a suit against a clinic to add a doctor as a defendant,
after the suit against the clinic had abandoned, did not create a new
suit against the doctor which could be maintained after the suit
against the clinic had abandoned.' Similarly, a plaintiffs motion to
compel discovery responses filed after his action had abandoned did
not revive the suit.'° Nor did a plaintiff's attempt to file a motion for
summary judgment or to reset a summary judgment for hearing after
the abandonment period had run revive his suit. 7 However, a step
taken by a defendant after the abandonment period has run may
constitute waiver of the right to plead abandonment. °
A. Steps In the Prosecution
Merely intending to take a step is not enough to interrupt the
abandonment period-the party must actually have taken the step."°
Generally, the action taken must be designed to have the effect of
hastening the matter tojudgment. Otherwise, the step is not sufficient
to interrupt abandonment. Much litigation has arisen regarding what
actions are sufficient to constitute a step in the prosecution or defense
of the suit sufficient to interrupt abandonment.
1. Actions Deemed Not Sufficient to PreventAbandonment
The following actions have generally been deemed to be
insufficient to prevent abandonment: correspondence, particularly if
not filed into the court record; settlement negotiations; and, motions
to withdraw, add, or substitute counsel. Correspondence filed into the
court record which evidenced the parties' willingness to participate
in mediation did not interrupt or suspend the running of the
104. Willey v. Roberts, 95-1037p.6 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/15/95), 664 So. 2d
1371, 1376 n.2, writ denied,96-0164 (La. 3/19/99),740 So. 2d 113.
105. Varnado v. Gentilly Medical Clinic for Women, 98-0264 (La. App. 4th Cir.
12/23/98), 728 So. 2d 479, writ denied,99-0146 (La. 3/19/99), 740 So. 2d 113.
106. Clarkv. Southern Tire Service, Inc., 20-1548 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2/14/01),
782 So. 2d 27.
107. Louisiana Central Credit Union v. LeBlanc, 98-23 (La. App. 5th Cir.
5/13/98), 721 So. 2d 9214; Jones v. Phelps, 95-0607 p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/9/95),
665 So. 2d 30, 33, writ denied,95-2907 (La. 2/2/96), 666 So. 2d 1104.
108. See infra Section IV(B) for discussion of waiver or acknowledgment as an
exception to abandonment.
109. Benjamin-Jenkins v. Lawson, 2000-0958 p.4, (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/7/01),
781 So. 2d 893,895, writ denied,2001-1546 (La. 9/4/01), 796 So. 2d 681; Sullivan
v. Cabral, 32-454 p.2, (La. App. 2nd Cir. 10/27/99), 745 So. 2d 791, 792, writ
denied, 99-3324 (La. 1/28/00), 753 So. 2d 837.
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abandonment period, at least where the mediation never actually took
place. ° Motions to withdraw, add or substitute counsel are not
formal steps before the court in the prosecution or defense of a suit.
Rather, these motions grant to counsel the rightto take steps, but do
not hasten the matter to judgment. "'
Settlement negotiations are not steps in the prosecution of a case
sufficient to interrupt abandonment and do not constitute a waiver by
defendant to plead abandonment." 2 Louisiana courts have stated that
the plaintiff is not relieved of the duty to protect the court record and
to prevent abandonment because of on-going settlement
negotiations." 3 In Chevron Oil Company v. Traigle, numerous
correspondence were filed into the court record which evidenced
extensive settlement negotiations between the parties." 4 However,
these were not formal actions sufficient to interrupt abandonment,
even though the negotiations were conducted pursuant to court
order.' The plaintiffs retained the ability to take a formal action in
the trial court to hasten the suit to judgment and could have set
6 the
case for trial if not satisfied with the settlement negotiations."
A liability insurer did not waive its right to plead abandonment by
acknowledging an agreement with the plaintiffs to withhold service
of the petition during settlement negotiations.' '
Settlement
negotiations were not a step that could interrupt abandonment, and
participation in settlement negotiations did not serve as a waiver of
the right to plead abandonment." 8 The general rule is that settlement
negotiations are not steps in the prosecution which will interrupt
abandonment, and settlement negotiations are not transformed into
110. Gallagher v. Cook, 34,158 p.5 (La. App. 2d Cir. 12/15/01), 775 So. 2d 79.
111. Chevron Oil Co. v. Traigle, 436 So. 2d 530, 532-33 (La. 1983); Willey v.
Roberts, 95-1037 p. 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/15/95), 664 So. 2d 1371, 1375, writ
denied,96-0164 (La. 3/15/96), 669 So. 2d 422; Brown v. City ofShreveport Urban
Dev., 34,657 p.1 (La. App. 2d Cir. 5/9/01), 786 So. 2d 253, 255 n.l; Varnado v.
Gentilly Med. Clinic for Women, 98-0264 p. 2 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/23/98), 728 So.
2d 479, 480-81, writ denied, 99-0146 (La. 3/19/99), 740 So. 2d 113; Brown v.
Edwards, 435 So. 2d 1073 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 441 So. 2d 751 (La.
1983); Lips v. Royal Ins. Co., 149 La. 359, 361, 89 So. 213, 215 (1921).
112. Newson v. Bailey, 88 So. 2d 391. 393 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1956); Porter v.
Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 99-2542 p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/8/00), 771 So. 2d
293, 295; Alexander v. Liberty Terrace Subdivision, Inc., 99-2171 p. 4 (La. App.
4th Cir. 4/12/00), 761 So. 2d 62, 64.
113. Lizama v. Williams, 99-1040 p.5 (La. App. 5th Cir. 3/22/00), 759 So. 2d
865, 868.
114. Chevron Oil Co. v. Traigle, 436 So. 2d 530, 533 (La. 1983).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Porter v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 99-2542 p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir.
11/8/00), 771 So. 2d 293, 295.
118. Id.
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formal steps in litigation merely by filing documents into the court
record.'19 Additionally, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently held
that an insurance company's submission of a binding tender was not
part of settlement negotiations; rather, it was a step in the defense of
the case which served to waive defendant's right to plead
abandonment. 20
Reported decisions offer a variety of examples of actions which
courts have found insufficient to prevent abandonment. For example,
the filing of a transcript of testimony was not regarded as a step to
avoid abandonment.' 2 Nor was payment of court costs a step in the
prosecution or defense of a case.12 The filing of a request for notice
was also not considered a step in the prosecution of the case. 2 1 The
plaintiff s filing a notice of suit to enforce a lien, which, at the time,
was not required to be filed and had no legal effect, was not a formal
step by plaintiff to prevent his suit from abandoning. 124 A joint
motion to continue a hearing was not a step in the prosecution ofthe
action to interrupt abandonment since, by its very nature, the motion
125
to continue was not intended to hasten the matter to judgment.
2. Actions Deemed Sufficient to PreventAbandonment
Generally, any action taken which is intended to hasten the suit to
judgment is a step sufficient to interrupt the abandonment period.
The following actions have met this standard: filing an amended
petition which does more than restate the original petition is a step in
the prosecution 126 and filing a supplemental response to discovery
119. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 33,960 p. 2 -3 (La. App. 2d Cir.
9/27/00), 769 So. 2d 176, 177-78, rev'd, 00-3010 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So. 2d 779.
120. Clark,00-3010 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So. 2d 779. 121. Henry v. Stephens, 169 So. 2d422,423 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1964); Newson
v. Bailey, 88 So. 2d 391, 393 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956); State through Dept. of
Highways v. Jackson, 211 So. 2d 93, 95 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Reagor v. First
Nat. Life Ins. Co., 85 So. 2d 312, 315 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
122. D & S Builders, Inc. v. Mickey Const. Co., Inc., 524 So. 2d 245,247 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1988). See also Sanders v. Luke, 92 So. 2d 156, 158-59 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1957).
123. D & S Builders, Inc., 524 So. 2d at 247.
124. Better Heating & Air Conditioning Co., Inc. v. United Ben. Fire Ins. Co.,
269 So. 2d 502, 505 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
125. Oliver v. Oliver, 95-1026 p. 13 - 14 (La. App. 3d Cir. 3/27/96), 671 So. 2d
1081, 1090. Butcompare with Watt v. Creppel, 67 So. 2d 341, 343 (La. App. Orl.
1953) (Orders for a continuance and an order making parties plaintiffs are sufficient
steps to avoid abandonment.).
126. Carraway v. City of Alexandria, 96-1629 p.4 - 5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 4/30/97),
693 So. 2d 314, 316; Guaringo v. Pendleton Mem'l Methodist Hosp., 94-1264 p. 3
(La. App. 4th Cir. 2/23/95), 650 So. 2d 1243, 1245; Succession of Moody, 306 So.
2d 869, 872 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), writ denied, 310 So. 2d 639 (La. 1975).
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requests and filing additional discovery requests within a five year
period were steps in the prosecution or defense of the suit which
prevented the suit from abandoning.' Additionally, an attorney's
payment ofajury fee on behalf ofhis client interrupted abandonment
because the payment was necessary to preserve a jury trial, and the
rule demanding payment was stamped by the clerk ofcourt's cashier
to show the payment had been received.121
In Modeliste v. Sehorn, the plaintiffs petition to nullify a
judgment ofdismissal as to all other plaintiffs in a breach of contract
suit, even ifplaintiff failed in his motion, was a step which precluded
a finding ofabandonment, notwithstanding the defendant's argument
that plaintiff had no right or cause of action. 29 The plaintiff had
demonstrated his desire to pursue his day in court. 30 Additionally,
Louisiana courts have also stated that an entry of an order of partial
dismissal of less than all defendants was effective to interrupt
abandonment as to all parties. 3 '
Similarly, entries in a call docket made on behalf of the plaintiff
in the orderly course oflitigation were a step in the prosecution ofthe
plaintiff's case. 3 2 Likewise, a motion to have an appeal placed on the
preference docket of the Louisiana Supreme Court was a step which
prevented abandonment. 33 A motion by a plaintiff to proceed in
formapauperiswas also a step to prevent abandonment. 3 A motion
to substitute party plaintiffs was an active step in prosecution of a suit
for default on a promissory note by a bank against the borrowers
where the bank had been closed and put into receivership, making the
35
motion to substitute plaintiffs necessary to proceed with the suit.

Filing a motion to set the case for trial will interrupt
abandonment. 36 InKanukv. Pohlman,even the filing ofan unsigned
127. Manale v. Executive Healthcare Recruiters, Inc., 98-2652 p.3 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 11/18/99), 747 So. 2d 1200, 1202, writnotconsidered,99-3595 (La. 2/18/00),
754 So. 2d 957.
128. Haleyv. Galuszka, 98-2854 p.5 (La. App. 4th Cir. 9/8/99), 744 So. 2d 170,
173, writdenied,99-2883 (La. 12/10/99), 751 So. 2d 857.
129. Modeliste v. Sehorn, 94-1994 p.3-4 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/29/95), 653 So.
2d 753, 756.
130. Id.
131. McCandless v. Poston, 540 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
132. Jones v. Arm Bank & Trust Co., 175 La. 160, 167-68, 143 So. 35, 38
(1932); Cocke v. Cavalier, 175 La. 151, 155, 143 So. 33, 34 (1932).
133. Barbari v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 96 So. 2d 252,254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
134. Acosta v. Hepplewhite Home, Inc., 450 So. 2d 770, 772 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1984).
135. Deposit Trust Say. Bank, FSB v. Kucharchuk, 99-0950 p. 2-3 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 8/12/99), 739 So. 2d 380, 381, writdenied, 99-2672 (La. 11/19/99), 749 So.
2d 684. See also Family Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n of Shreveport v. Huckaby, 30,481
(La. App. 2d Cir. 5/13/98), 714 So. 2d 80.
136. Coastal Erection Co., Inc. v. Milan Eng'g Co., 305 So. 2d 713, 715 (La.
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motion to fix trial on the merits was a step in the prosecution of the
case, since the failure to sign the motion was a technical defect
only. 13' Here, the plaintiff intended to take a step to hasten his suit to
judgment and clearly did not intend to abandon his suit. 38 Likewise,
a motion by the plaintiff in open court to place
39 the case on the trial
docket was a step to interrupt abandonment.
However, in Melancon v. Wood, the plaintiffs counsel filed a
motion to fix the case for trial on the merits which was physically
received in the clerk's office and physically placed in the file
folder.'40 The plaintiff's counsel denied ever receiving a bill for costs
and failed to pay the filing fee. Consequently, the order to fix trial
was never presented to the judge for signing. The court found no
steps in the prosecution of41the case had been taken, and the suit was
dismissed as abandoned.
3. DiscoveryMethods to InterruptAbandonment
Cases involving discovery issues present special problems when
considered in connection with the abandonment article. Prior to
1952, all discovery necessarily involved formal actions before the
trial court. In 1952, the Depositions and Discovery Act 42 relieved
trial courts of issuing formal orders for discovery. This change
created a pitfall for the unwary, as the courts refused to consider
discovery to be steps in the prosecution of the case since they were
not taken in the trial court. Therefore, after 1952, formal discovery
requests had to be filed into the court record to be considered steps to
avoid abandonment.4 3 However, the 1997 amendment to Article 561
App. 4th Cir. 1974). See also Evergreen Plantation, Inc. v. Zunamon, 272 So. 2d
414 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 274 So. 2d 708 (La. 1973).
137. Kanuk v. Pohlmann, 338 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), writdenied,
341 So. 2d 420 (La. 1977) (even where plaintiff's counsel subsequently moved to
upset the trial date).
138. Id.
139. Crabtree v. Reed, 224 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1969).
140. Coastal Erection Co., Inc. v. Milan Engineering Co., 305 So. 2d 713 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1974).
141. Id.
142. 1952 La. Acts No. 202, §2; See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 1421 (1960)
formerly La. R.S. 13:3741.
143. See, e.g., Melancon v. Wood, 303 So. 2d 222 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974);
Edwards v. Giambrone, 353 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), writ denied,354
So. 2d 1375 (La. 1978); Michel v. Home Town Supermarket, Inc,, 493 So. 2d 142
(La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 493 So. 2d 1207 (La. 1986); De Salvo v.
Waguespack, 187 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); DeClouet v. Kansas City
Southern Railway Co., 176 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 3rd Cir.), writ refused, 248 La.
383, 178 So. 2d 662 (La. 1965). But compare with Charpentier v. Goudeau, 952357 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/14/96), 671 So. 2d 981.
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created an exception to the "in the trial court" requirement by
expressly stating that discovery actions would interrupt
abandonment. It was no longer necessary to file formal discovery
requests into the court record.'" Consequently, cases discussing
whether actions related to discovery are sufficient to prevent
abandonment must be read in the context of both of these
developments.
InBreauxv, Auto Zone, Incorporated,a manufacturer defendant
served plaintiffs interrogatories requesting medical records. 4 The
plaintiffs, an injured motorist and passenger, sent the manufacturer
a letter, which attached medical reports. The letter did not reference
the discovery requests or identify the medical reports as discovery
responses; however, the letter and medical reports were construed
I
as formal discovery that interrupted the abandonment period. "6
Conversely, in Sullivan v. Cabral,discovery requests sent to the
defendant's former attorney were not effective to prevent the
plaintiff's action from abandoning where the defendant's former
attorney's motion47to withdraw and substitute counsel was filed into
the court record.
Other reported cases state that a request for production of
documents filed by a non party was not a step in the prosecution of
the plaintiff's case and did not prevent his suit from abandoning.'48
However, the filing of a notice to take the deposition of a non-party
was a step in the prosecution of the case.' 9 These cases can be
reconciled by considering that the former did not involve an action
taken by aparty,which is required, whereas the latter involved an
action taken by a party.
A court order granting an extension oftime for discovery did not
constitute taking a step in the prosecution ofthe case." 0 However,
a motion to compel discovery responses was a step in the
prosecution, even though the motion was filed by the plaintiffs
trustee rather than the plaintiff's attorney ofrecord, and the motion

144. Brister v. Manville Forest Products, 32,386 (La. App. 2d Cir. 12/15/99),
749 So. 2d 881.
145. Breaux v. Auto Zone, Inc., 00-1534 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/15/00), 787 So.
2d 322, writ denied,01-0172, 787 So. 2d 316 (La. 3/16/01).
146. Id.
147. Sullivan v. Cabral, 32,454 (La. App. 2d Cir. 10/ 27/99), 745 So. 2d 791,
writ denied,99-3324 (La. 1/28/00), 753 So. 2d 837.
148. Picone v. Lyons, 94-2428 (La. App. 4th Cir. 4/26/95), 653 So. 2d 1375,
reh 'g denied,writdenied, 95-1506 (La. 9/29/95), 660 So. 2d 852.
149. Viesel v. Republic Ins. Co., 95-0244 (La. App. 4th Cir. 11/30/95), 665 So.
2d 1221, writ denied,95-3099 (La. 2/16/96), 667 So. 2d 1058.
150. Campbell v. Hartford Ins. Co., 95-1484 (La. App. 3d Cir. 4/3/96), 671 So.
2d 1133.
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was technically defective.'
A motion to compel discovery
responses from one defendant interrupted abandonment as to all
solidary defendants.'
In Delta Development Company, Inc. v. Jurgens, the plaintiff
directed interrogatories to only one defendant, but that step
interrupted abandonment as to all defendants, even though they were
not solidary obligors.' 3 When any party takes a formal step in the
54
trial court, it is effective as to all parties to interrupt abandonment.
However, in yet another case, interrogatories were mailed to plaintiffs
but were not mailed to all parties." The interrogatories were null
and void since they were unsigned and could not be considered a ste
in the prosecution or defense of the suit to prevent abandonment.)
B. In the Trial Court
In order for abandonment to be interrupted, a party must take a
formal action intended to hasten the suit toward judgment and that
action must be taken in the trial court. As previously noted, a
exception to the "in the trial court" requirement was created in
the1997 amendment of Article 561. The exception recognizes that
formal discovery steps, taken outside the trial court record, will
prevent a suit from abandoning. However, all other actions must be
taken in the trial court.
Although some dicta in Melancon v. ContinentalGas Company
has been rejected, the case still stands for the proposition that actions
taken outside the trial court will not prevent abandonment of a suit.,57
The plaintiff's actions taken in a related federal court proceeding did
not prevent the state court proceeding from being dismissed on
grounds of abandonment. 5 Likewise, a confession of judgment
executed by the defendant and recorded in the parish mortgage
records was not a step in the trial court to prevent abandonment.'59
Actions taken in one of two identical proceedings, where
plaintiffs in each proceeding had the same counsel, did not interrupt
abandonment in the other proceeding, absent an express agreement in
151. Maddie v. Fidelity Nat. Bank, 93-2308 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/25/94), 641 So.
2d 1098.
152. Rollins v. Causey, 427 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
153. Delta Development Co., Inc. v. Jurgens, 456 So. 2d 145 (La. 1984).
154. Id.
155. Benjamin-Jenkins v. Lawson, 00-0958 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/701), 781 So.
2d 893, reh'g denied,writ denied, 01-1546 (La. 9/14/01), 796 So. 2d 681.
156. Id.
157. Melancon v. Continental Cas. Co., 307 So. 2d 308 (La. 1975).
158. Id.
159. National Food Stores ofLa., Inc. v. Chustz, 361 So. 2d 273 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 362 So. 2d 1120 (1978).
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the record that the decision in one would be binding in the other. 6
However, the separation ofthe plaintiffs suit against a physician and
a hospital into two separate records was an administrative act by the
clerk ofcourt that did not destroy the plaintiff's essentially singular
action. 61 The plaintiff's action against the physician and hospital had
the same caption. Thus, the hospital's exception of prescription to
the amended complaint also interrupted abandonment
in the medical
62
malpractice lawsuit against the physician.
In another Louisiana appellate court decision, a manufacturer
defendant filed bankruptcy after commencement of the plaintiffs
wrongful death suit. 63 The court held that the actions taken by the
manufacturer in the bankruptcy court did not interrupt or suspend the
running of abandonment with respect to the remaining defendants in
the wrongful death suit filed in state court. 1 " The manufacturer
objected to the plaintiffs' claim in the bankruptcy court and requested
production of documents. The bankruptcy court modified the
automatic stay to allow the plaintiff to proceed with the pending
wrongful death action165
C. In the Record
The "in the record" requirement ensures that an examination of
the record will reveal the status of the litigation without resort to
extrinsic evidence and assures that there will be certainty in
determining whether the action has been abandoned. 66 The record
must contain evidence of the step or steps taken in the prosecution or
defense, and generally, a step taken outside the record cannot be
considered. 67 However, the 1997 amendment to Article 561 created
an express exception to this requirement by allowing discovery to
interrupt abandonment, although not filed into the record. Therefore,
cases addressing the "in the record" requirement should be read in
160. Lips v. Royal Ins. Co., 149 La. 359, 89 So.213 (1921).
161. Wilkes v. Carroll, 32,752 (La. App. 2d Cir. 4/5/00), 756 So. 2d 1257, writ
denied, 00-1960 (La. 6/23/00), 765 So. 2d 1043.
162. Id.
163. Sassau v. Louisiana Workover Serv., Inc., 607 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 609 So. 2d 259 (1992).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Willey V.Roberts, 95-1037 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/15/95), 664 So. 2d 1371,
writ denied, 96-0164 (La. 3/15/96), 669 So. 2d 422.
167. Sliman v. Araguel, 196 La. 859, 200 So. 280 (1941); Lewis v. City ofNew
Orleans, 99-0795 (La. App. 4th Cir. 11/17/99), 748 So. 2d 522; Melancon v.
Continental Cas. Co., 307 So. 2d 308 (La. 1975); Richey v. Fetty, 96-2762 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 4/8/98), 715 So. 2d 1, reh'g denied, writ denied, 98-2184 (La.
11/13/98), 731 So. 2d 257.
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light of this amendment, as well as the 1952 Deposition and
Discovery Act, which eliminated the requirement that discovery be
conduced under court order.
In Burkett v. Resolution Trust Corporation,a letter was mailed
requesting service of process the day before the end of the
abandonment period. 6 Yet, the letter was not filed into the record
until the day after the abandonment period had run. 69 The appellate
court held that the suit abandoned. 7 Similarly, where the plaintiffs
letter to the clerk of court requesting service on the defendants and
paying service costs was not filed into the record, the abandonment
period was not interrupted. 7 ' Additionally, where the plaintiffs
counsel sent a letter to the clerk ofcourt requesting service ofprocess
on one defendant and the clerk stamped the letter "received" rather
than "filed," this action was sufficient to prevent abandonment. 72
However, a letter by the plaintiffs attorney to the trial judge
requesting that the case be set for
trial was not a step taken in the trial
173
court to prevent abandonment.
A Louisiana appellate court has also reviewed a case where a
motion to set a case for trial,.although submitted to the clerk of court
and stamped received, was not filed into the record and was returned
for failure to comply with court rules. 174 The motion
was not
75
resubmitted in proper form; thus, the case abandoned.
D. By a Party
The step must be taken by a party to the lawsuit in order to
interrupt abandonment. The abandonment article does not distinguish
which party must take a step; therefore, an action taken by any party
168. Burkett v. Resolution Trust Corp., 99-1163, (La. App. 5th Cir. 2/29/00),
757 So. 2d 819.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Hargis ex rel Krey v. Jefferson Parish, 99-0971 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/8/99),
748 So. 2d 606, rev'd, 00-0072 (La. 3/17/00), 755 So. 2d 891, reh 'gdenied, La.
00-0072 (La. 5/5/00), 760 So. 2d 1188.
172. Shulver v. Slocum, 566 So. 2d 1089 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 569
So. 2d 984 (La. 1990).
173. Tinsley v. Stafford, 93-1668 (La. App. 1st Cit. 10/7/94), 644 So. 2d 677,
writ denied, 94-2753 (La. 1/6/95), 648 So. 2d 933. But compare with, ElIzey v.
Employers Mut. Liability Ins., 388 So. 2d 843 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 394
So. 2d 617 (La. 1980) (Letters from the plaintiff's attorney requesting that the case
be set for trial, although not a formal pleading, complied with local court rules and
practices and prevented abandonment, despite the fact that plaintiff failed to post
jury bond.).
174. Parson v. Daigle, 96-2569 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/29/97), 708 So. 2d 746.
175. Id.
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may be sufficient to interrupt abandonment. 7 6 Steps by non-parties
will not suffice. This requirement embodies the principle that the
plaintiff or the defendant must clearly demonstrate, by the action
taken, his intent not to treat the case as abandoned.
When a party takes a formal action in the trial court, the action 1is
77
generally effective as to all parties to interrupt abandonment.
Likewise, when no step is taken during the abandonment period,
abandonment is effective as to all parties. 178 No formal order
dismissing the case on grounds of abandonment is necessary, as
abandonment is self-operative. 79
Louisiana courts have refused to allow actions of nonparties to
interrupt abandonment. For example, in Freedlander,Incorporated,
The MortggePeople v. Certain,a process server's action in carrying
out service and filing the service return into the trial court were not
steps taken by a party. 8 ' Similarly, in another Louisiana appellate
case, the clerk ofcourt's issuance ofcitations and the sheriff's service
of those citations, as a result ofthe plaintiff's motion to make certain
persons parties, were not steps in the prosecution by the plaintiff that
could interrupt the abandonment period."' Louisiana courts have
also held that notices of rulings filed into the record by appellate
182
courts were not steps taken by a party to interrupt abandonment.
However, in American Eagle, Incorporatedv. Employers'Liability
AssuranceCorporation,Limited, a post trial conference called by the
trialjudge was a step taken by the "parties" and, therefore, interrupted
the abandonment period.'
This case may be explained by
remembering that abandonment does not apply after submission of
the case on the merits.
The circuit courts disagree on the issue of the effect of actions
taken on served and unserved defendants and even disagree internally
176. State ex rel Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Ramos, 98-0534 (La. App. 1st Cir.
4/13/99), 755 So. 2d 257, writ granted 99-3536 (La. 2/11/00), 754 So. 2d 923,
reh 'gdenied,99-3536 (La. 3/24/00), 757 So. 2d 649; Modeliste v. Sehorn, 94-1994
(La. App. 4th Cir. 3/29/95), 653 So. 2d 753.
177. Wilkes v. Carroll, 32,752 (La. App. 2dCir. 4/5/00), 756 So. 2d 1257, writ
denied, 00-1960 (La. 6/23/00), 765 So. 2d 1043.
178. Picone v. Lyons, 94-2428 (La. App. 4th Cir. 4/26/95), 653 So. 2d 1375,
reh 'g denied, writ denied, 95-1506 (La. 9/29/95), 660 So. 2d 852.; Sassau v.
Louisiana Workover Serv., Inc., 607 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
609 So. 2d 259 (1992).
179. Picone,653 So. 2d 1375 Sassau,607 So. 2d 809.
180. Freedlander, Inc. v. Certain, 623 So. 2d 677 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
181. Seligman v. G. A. Scott & Bro., 17 La. App. 486, 134 So. 771 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1931).
182. James v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 01-2056 (La. 4/3/02), 813 So. 2d 335.
183. An. Eagle, Inc. v. Emp. Liability Assur. Corp., 389 So. 2d 1339 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1980), writs denied, 396 So. 2d 885, 396 So. 2d 886 (La. 1981).
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within the circuits. In one case, a defendant was never served with
process and another defendant was served six years after suit was
filed. "' The plaintiff's suit against these unserved defendants
abandoned." 5 Yet, in another case, the plaintiff's suit did not
abandon when he filed a motion within five years of filing suit to take
the defendant's deposition with an attached order which was signed
by the trial judge the same day.8 6 The defendant had not been served
with process or with a copy of the plaintiffs motion to take his
deposition until more than five years after suit was filed.8 7 However,
the latest pronouncements seem to hold that an action taken with
respect to any one defendant might be considered a step in the
prosecution of all defendants, regardless ofwhether they have been
served."18
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO ABANDONMENT

Two exceptions to abandonment have been recognized since the
inception of the rule in Louisiana Civil Code article 3519 (1870).
The first is a plaintiff-oriented exception based on the doctrine contra
non valentum agere nulla curritprescriptio,where the failure to
prosecute is due to circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control. The
second is a defendant-oriented exception based on acknowledgment,
where the defendant waives the right to plead abandonment by taking
an action inconsistent with an intent to treat the case as abandoned.
Each exception follows well-established rules of prescription.8 9
A. CircumstancesBeyond Plaintiff'sControl
The courts have recognized a plaintiff-oriented exception to
abandonment where a plaintiff is prevented from taking a step in the
prosecution of his case because of circumstances beyond his control.
Courts have interpreted the phrase "circumstances beyond the
plaintiff s control" to contemplate events creating a legal impediment
which makes it impossible for the plaintiff to act on his own behalf
184. Wicker v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 418 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 5th Cir.),
writ denied,423 So. 2d 1148 (La. 1982). See also Bolden v. Brazile, 172 So. 2d
304 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
185. Wicker, 418 So. 2d at 1378.
186. Landry v. Thomas, 422 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), writ denied,
429 So. 2d 143 (La. 1983).
187. Id.
188. Guarino v. Pendleton Mern. Methodist Hosp., 94-1264 (La. App. 4th Cir.
2/23/95), 650 So. 2d 1243; Sprowl v. Wohl, 576 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writdenied, 580 So. 2d 928 (La. 1991).
189. Melancon v. Continental Cas. Co., 307 So. 2d 308, 311 (La. 1975).
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to take the necessary steps to prevent abandonment.'" This exception
has been given a very narrow scope, and only two circumstances have
been found to comply. To meet the exception, the plaintiff must
show either (1) he was serving in the armed forces of the United
States or (2) he was confined to a mental institution. 9 ' Louisiana
courts have generally rejected all other excuses.
For example, Louisiana courts have stated that a plaintiffs
allegations in his appellate brief regarding his mental and emotional
state and "disabling depression" were not proof of circumstances
beyond his control which prevented him from taking a step in
prosecution sufficient to prevent his suit from abandoning.1 92
Likewise, a plaintiff s eight years ofincarceration and the withdrawal
of his counsel during that time were not considered circumstances
beyond his control."' Here, the court stated that the plaintiffs
incarceration and unsuccessful attempts to engage new counsel did
not create legal impediments which prevented him from prosecuting
his case. 94 The court noted that the plaintiffcould have, but failed to,
move his case toward judgment for a period of eleven years. 19'
Likewise, in Succession ofKnox, a Louisiana appellate court ruled
that a plaintiff's inattention to her suit was her fault rather than the
fault of the defendant. 196 The court reasoned that even though the
plaintiff may have been unaware that her attorneys were not
prosecuting her case and that her suit could abandon, these were not
circumstances beyond her control. 197 Nor was her lack of notice of
the ex parte motion to dismiss the suit considered relevant, since
abandonment o~curred by operation of law, even if no party moved
for formal dismissal.198
In another case, the appellate court rejected the plaintiff s excuses
that one of her attorneys had been disbarred, another faced
190. Jones v. Phelps, 95-0607 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/95), 665 So. 2d 30, 34.
191. Aucoinv. Baton Rouge Jaycees, Inc., 491 So. 2d422, 424-25 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1986); Jones, 95-0607 at p.6, 665 So. 2d at 34.
192. Aucoin, 491 So. 2d at 424-25
193. Jones, 95-0607 at p.6, 665 So. 2d at 34.
194. Id.
195. Id. See alsoHaisty v. State through Dept. ofTransp., 25,670 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 3/30/94), 634 So. 2d 919, 922 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that withdrawal
ofD.O.T.D.'s counsel and failure ofAttorney General to enter lawsuit as mandated
by law prevented her from prosecuting her suit-no legal impediment was created)i
Brown v. Edwards, 435 So. 2d 1073, 1075-76 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,441
So. 2d 751 (La. 1983) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that their attorney had withdrawn
prevented them from prosecuting case; litigants always have the power to discharge
an attorney who neglects or refuses to act and to replace him with a new attorney);
Courtney v. Henderson, 602 So. 2d 95, 97 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
196. Succession of Knox, 579 So. 2d 1164 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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disbarment, and her file had been destroyed in a fire at one of her
attorney's offices.' 9 9 The court found that these were not
circumstances beyond her control that prevented her from
prosecuting her case. 2" Likewise, another appellate court rejected
a plaintiff's arguments that the defendant's failure to submit
pretrial inserts pursuant to the court's order prevented her from
prosecuting her case, pointing out that the plaintiff could have
filed a motion to compel the defendant's pretrial inserts.2 '
The Louisiana Supreme Court also rejected arguments that a
plaintiff was prevented from prosecuting her case against a
defendant in the trial court while her appeal of a dismissal of
another defendant was pending. °2 The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs cause of action against the defendant in the trial court
was not implicated in the appeal, and she was not prevented from
prosecuting that action because of the pending appeal involving
the other defendant. 0 3
B. Waiver ofDefendant's Right to PleadAbandonment
In Melancon v. ContinentalCasualty Company, the Louisiana
Supreme Court recognized the codification of the jurisprudential
exception ofwaiver by a defendant in Article 56 1.2 In Melancon,
the plaintiff filed suit in state court seeking damages for personal
injuries. The plaintiff won ajury verdict, and the trial court signed
a judgment. However, defendants sought and were granted a new
trial. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a separate law suit in federal
court challenging the constitutionality ofthejudicial review offact
in Louisiana.'0 5 All defendants in the state court suit were joined
as indispensable parties in the federal court proceeding. The
plaintiff's claims were rejected by the lower federal courts,
decisions
ultimately affirmed by the United State Supreme
206
Court.

Thereafter, the plaintiff requested that a new trial date be set
in state court, pursuant to the judge's order granting the new trial
seven years earlier. The defendants moved to dismiss the state

.199. Willey v. Roberts, 95-1037 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/15/95), 664 So. 2d 1371,
writ denied,96-0164 (La. 3/15/96), 669 So. 2d 422.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. James v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 01-2056 (La. 4/3/02), 813 So. 2d 335.
203. Id.
204. Melancon v. Continental Cas. Co., 307 So. 2d 308 (La. 1975)
205. Id. at 309-10.
206. Id. at310.
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court action on grounds of abandonment. °7 The trial court denied
20 8
the motion to dismiss. However,the First Circuit reversed.
The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the plaintiffs actions
in the federal court were not steps taken in the state court suit and
did not serve to interrupt the abandonment period.20 9 Since the
actions in the federal court were not steps in the trial court
sufficient to interrupt abandonment, the plaintiffs suit could
survive only if he could show one of the exceptions to the
abandonment article applied.2 '0 The plaintiff did not argue that
circumstances beyond his control prevented him from taking a step
toward the prosecution of his state court action.2 Instead, he
argued that the defense-oriented exception based on
acknowledgment saved his state court case.2 12
The plaintiff argued that the defendants waived the right to
seek a dismissal on grounds of abandonment since they had agreed
to an informal request by the federal court to delay proceeding
with the state court action until the federal suit had been
resolved.2t 3 The redactors' comments to Article 561 (1960)
explained that the jurisprudential concept of waiver under the
previous article 3519 was limited to instances where the defendant
had taken a formal step in the defense of the suit within a five year
period of plaintiffs inaction. 4 Under these circumstances, the
defendant indicated his intent to treat the case as unabandoned and
was estopped from pleading abandonment. 1 5
The Melancon court reasoned that the waiver exception in
Article 561 differed from its source article in La.C.C. article 3519
(1870) in two respects:
1. Article 561 expressly declared that abandonment is self
operative; and,
2. Article 561 provided that failure by the parties (without
distinction as to which party must act) to take a step in
the prosecution or defense resulted in abandonment.

207. Id.
208. Melancon v. Continental Cas. Co., 295 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
209. Melancon, 307 So. 2d at 310.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See La. Code Civ. P. Art. 561, comment (c) (1960); Melancon v.
Continental Gas Co., 307 So. 2d at 311.
215. Melancon, 307 So. 2d at 311-12, citing Green v. Small, 227 La. 401, 79 So.
2d 497 (1955); Geisenberger v. Cotton, 116 La. 651, 40 So. 929 (1906).
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The Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted this language as codifying
the defense-oriented waiver exception." 6 Further, the Melancon court
stated that Article 561:
incorporated the waiver exception only to the extent that a
formal step taken by a defendant in his defense interrupts the
five-year abandonment period and commences it running
anew. Clearly, under the present version of article 561,
formal action taken by the defendant after the expiration of
five years' inactivity will not preclude a later plea of
abandonment by him.217
However, this dicta was criticized and finally rejected by later
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions."
InMelancon, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the defendants' informal agreement in federal court
waived their right to plead abandonment in state court. The court
noted that the traditional meaning of "steps in the prosecution or
defense" of a suit required a formal action before the court which was
intended to hasten judgment.2" 9 The policy behind the Article 561
prevented protracted litigation. However, a determination that a
plaintiff is not seriously pursuing his claim so as to subject his suit to
abandonment must be certain. Therefore, any step toward the
prosecution or defense of the action must appear in the court record
so that examination ofthe record "reveal[s] the status ofthe litigation
with certainty and without resort to extrinsic evidence."22
Furthermore, no contradictory hearing is required and extrinsic
evidence is not permitted. Any party or other interested person may
file an ex parte motion to dismiss on grounds of abandonment."'
Thus, since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had taken any
action in the state trial court which served to interrupt the
abandonment period, the state court action in Melancon had
abandoned.222
Some dicta in Melancon was later rejected by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Clarkv.State.FarmMutualAutomobileInsurance
216. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 33,960 (La. App. 2d Cir.9/27/00),
769 So. 2d 176, rev'd, 00-3010 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So. 2d 779, citing Melancon v.
Continental Cas. Co., 307 So. 2d 308, 312 (La. 1975).
217. Melancon, 307 So. 2d at 312, n.2.
218. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 00-3010 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So. 2d
779.
219. Melancon, 307 So. 2d at 312.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at313.
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Company.22 3 The Clarkcourt noted that a number of Louisiana cases
had held a defendant's action after the abandonment period had
224
accrued constituted a waiver of the right to plead abandonment.
Examples included a defendant's submission of an abandoned case
for decision, agreeing to a trial setting, seeking security for costs, and
provoking or responding to discovery.225 In some cases, a pleading
by a defendant going to the merits of the case, even if filed after the
five year abandonment period had accrued, acted as a waiver of the
defendant's right to seek a dismissal on the basis of abandonment. 226
Likewise, in Chevron Oil Company v. Traigle,the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that joining in a motion for summary judgment and
submitting the case for decision on the merits after the abandonment
period accrued waived the defendant's right to assert the defense of
abandonment. 2 "
The Clarkcourt also rejected the Melanconcourt's dicta refusing
to permit the use of extrinsic evidence to prove interruption of
abandonment as incorrect and inconsistent with Louisiana
jurisprudence. 228 The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that an
order dismissing a suit for abandonment could be set aside upon a
showing that a cause outside the record prevented the accrual of the
abandonment period-one cause which could be the waiver
exception.229
Despite the later rejection ofmuch of the dicta in Melancon, the
case still stands for the proposition that a step must be taken in the
trialcourtto interrupt abandonment. Actions in federal court, even
though involving the same parties and same cause of action, will not
suffice.230
The latest pronouncement by the Louisiana Supreme Court on the
waiver exception came in Clark v. State Farm MutualAutomobile
223. Clarkv. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 00-3010 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So. 2d
779, 789 n.15.
224. Middleton v. Middleton, 526 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988);
Melancon v. Continental Cas. Co., 307 So. 2d 308, 312 (La. 1975); Chevron Oil
Co. v. Traigle, 436 So. 2d 530, 533 (La. 1983).
225. Clark, 00-3010 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So. 2d 779, 789.
226. State ex rel. Shields, Inc. v. Southport Petroleum Corp., 230 La. 199, 88
So. 2d 25 (1956); Continental Supply Co. v. Fisher Oil Co., 156 La. 101, 100 So.
64(1924).
227. Chevron Oil Co. v. Traigle, 436 So. 2d 530 (La. 1983).
228. Clark, 00-3010, 785 So. 2d 779, 789.
229. Clark, 00-3010,785 So. 2d at 789, citing Chevron Oil Co., 436 So. 2d530
and DeClouet, 176 So. 2d at 476.
230. But comparewith Johnson v. Berg Mech. Indus., 35,290 (La. App. 2nd Cir.
12/19/01), 803 So. 2d 1067, writ denied,02-0240 (La. 4/26/02), 814 So. 2d 556
(depositions taken in worker's compensation proceeding were steps in prosecution
that interrupted abandonment of state court tort suit).
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Insurance Company.23' In Clark, the plaintiff sued for injuries
sustained in an automobile accident. Clark was a guest passenger in
the vehicle. Both he and the driver were insured by State Farm.
Clark filed suit against State Farm on January 16, 1996. Because of
on-going settlement negotiations, the plaintiff withheld service but
provided State Farm with a courtesy copy of the petition and copies
of his medical records.232 State Farm made an unconditional tender
of $3,000 to Clark on October 14, 1996, in compliance with its
obligations under the uninsured motorist policies and La. R.S.
22:658A(l). Clark accepted the tender by cashing the check. No
other action was taken until June 15, 1999, when Clark filed a copy
ofthe tender check and correspondence into the record and requested
that State Farm be served with the petition. State Farm filed an ex
parte motion to dismiss on grounds of abandonment.233 The trial
court signed the ex parte order of dismissal, and plaintiff filed a
motion to set aside the order. The trial court set aside the order
dismissing State Farm, reasoning that the unconditional tender was
a step in the defense of the case which interrupted the abandonment
period.23 4

The appellate court reversed, stating the tender by State Farm was
part of the settlement negotiation process, which has been held not to
be a step in the prosecution or defense sufficient to interrupt
abandonment.235 The appellate court considered the unconditional
tender to be neither a formal step nor a step designed to hasten the
matter to trial.2 36 The appellate court also noted that the
unconditional tender was not even made part of the record until after
the suit had abandoned by operation of law.23 7
The appellate court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that the
unconditional tender was a mode offormal discovery, exempted from
the "on the record" requirement in Article 561(B). The appellate
court stated that the tender of an undisputed sum is a form of
negotiation rather than a form of discovery.2 3' Relying on Chevron
Oil Co. v. Traigle,239 the appellate court stated that steps in settlement
negotiations were not transformed into formal steps in the prosecution
231. Clark,00-3010, 785 So. 2d at 779.
232. Id.,785 So. 2d at 781.
233. Id., 785 So. 2d at 781-82.
234. Id., 785 So. 2d at 782.
235. Id., citing Newson v. Bailey, 88 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
236. Clark,00-3010, 785 So. 2d at 782.
237. Id., 785 So. 2d at 783.
238. Id.,785 So. 2d at 783.
239. Chevron Oil Co. v. Traigle, 436 So. 2d 530 (La. 1983) (Correspondence
filed into the record evidencing settlement negotiations was not a step in the
prosecution or defense ofthe suit.).
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or defense of a suit merely by filing evidence of the negotiations into
the record.2 4" The appellate court further noted that the plaintiff was
not prevented from taking steps toward the prosecution of his case
designed to hasten the suit to judgment, even though he was involved
in settlement negotiations.24 '
In Clark, the Louisiana Supreme Court also noted an inherent
distinction between post-abandonment actions taken by a plaintiff and
by a defendant. While a plaintiffs actions taken after a suit has
abandoned cannot revive the action, a defendant's actions taken
after abandonment can serve to waive his right to plead
abandonment. 242 Furthermore, waiver requires a "definite action"
by a defendant. 43 In order to determine the qualitative effect ofthe
step or steps taken by a defendant, courts must perform a case-bycase analysis to ascertain whether the defendant's actions constitute
a definite action resulting in waiver of the right to plead
abandonment. 2 "
The qualitative effect of State Farm's action in making the
unconditional tender was to avoid penalties and attorneys fees
should it ultimately be proven that State Farm owed coverage under
the policy. Therefore, the action protected State Farm from certain
liability exposure at the conclusion of the case.2 45 The Louisiana
Supreme Court found no distinction between a defendant's conduct
occurring before rather than after the case has abandoned.246 The
Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that a defendant's conduct,
which would constitute acknowledgment if taken after the
abandonment period accrued, could be established by evidence
outside the record to be a pre-abandonment waiver based on
acknowledgment. This conduct would also serve to start the
abandonment period running anew. 247
Thus, State Farm's
unconditional tender served as a pre-abandonment waiver which
interrupted the abandonment period, causing the period to start
running anew. 241
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's
characterization of the unconditional tender as merely a step in

240. Clark,00-3010, 785 So. 2d at 783.
241. Id., 785 So. 2d at 783.
242. Id., 785 So. 2d at 789.
243. Id., 785 So. 2d at 789, citing Middleton v. Middleton, 526 So. 2d 859,860
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
244. Clark,00-3010, 785 So. 2d at 792, citing Middleton, 526 So. 2d at 860-61.
245. Clark, 00-3010, 785 So. 2d at 792.
246. Id., 785 So. 2d at 792.
247. Id., 785 So. 2d at 792.
248. Id., 785 So. 2d at 792.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63

The court noted that
informal settlement negotiations. 249
acknowledgment is a "simple admission of liability resulting in the
interruption of prescription that has commenced to run, but not
accrued, and may be made on an informal basis."25 The court
further noted that a tacit acknowledgment could occur when a
debtor makes an unconditional offer of payment.25 ' Therefore, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held State Farm's unconditional tender to
be an acknowledgment for purposes of abandonment.252
V. SUBMISSION OF CASE FOR DECISION ON THE MERITS

The abandonment article does not apply to cases which have been
submitted for a decision on the merits. The reasoning is that once a
case is submitted, its disposition has been removed from the control
of the parties. The goal ofhasty resolution of disputes would not be
served by allowing a defendant to dismiss a suit for abandonment
after it has been submitted for decision on the merits.2 3 In Chevron
Oil Co. v. Traigle, the plaintiff's suit was abandoned; however,
defendant waived the right to have the suit dismissed on grounds of
abandonment since it had joined in a motion for summary judgment
and submitted the case for decision. By filing the motion for
summary judgment, the defendant consented to have the case
resolved on the merits.254
In Bryantv. Travelers Ins. Co.,255 the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that abandonment was inapplicable to a case which had been
submitted for decision on the merits. In Bryant, a trial was held on
the plaintiff's claims for wrongful death and injury, after which the
judge granted the plaintiffs approximately two months within which
to submit their trial brief. The defendants would have ten days
thereafter to submit their brief, whereupon the court would take the
matter under advisement. The plaintiffs' trial briefwas not filed until
249. Id.,785 So. 2d at 791, noting that La. R.S. 22:658(A)(1) (2000) required a
tender to be unconditional and therefore, by definition, could not be a settlement
offer.

250. Id., 785 So. 2d at 792, citing Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So. 2d 624, 625 (La.
1992).
251. Clark, 00-3010, 785 So. 2d at 792; Lima, 595 So. 2d at 634.

252. Clark, 00-3010, 785 So. 2d at 792. See also Sterling v. Ins. Co. of
Pennsylvania, 572 So. 2d 835,837 (La. App. 4th Cir.1991). Defendants continued
the trial date indefinitely, voluntarily acknowledged their obligation, and made
monthly payments for over five years for compensation and medical; such actions
were inconsistent with an intent to treat the case as abandoned. Sterling,572 So.
2d 837.
253. Chevron Oil Co. v. Traigle, 436 So. 2d 530, 535 (La.1983).
254. Id. at 534.
255. Bryant v. Travelers Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d 606 (La. 1974).
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more than five years after the deadline set by the court." 6 The judge
who heard the case at trial had retired, and his replacement heard the
defendant's motion to dismiss the suit for abandonment. The judge
ruled the case had been submitted for decision and denied the motion
to dismiss. 5 7 The appellate court reversed, interpreting the original
order's language to mean that the case would not be submitted until
the briefs were filed. Therefore, the suit had abandoned.258
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the original order's
language to be ambiguous. To avoid a remand ofthe case, the parties
stipulated that the record should be expanded to include the trial court
rules and the transcript of the show cause hearing held in the trial
court.259 The trial court rule stated that cases were considered
submitted for decision even if no trial briefs were ever filed. On that
basis, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the case had been
submitted and taken under advisement, and no delays in decision could
be attributed to the plaintiff. Thus, the trial court was correct to deny
defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of abandonment.2"
Richard v. Fetty addressed the res nova issue of whether a partial
" ' The plaintiff sued multiple defendants
abandonment was possible.26
and, after one defendant failed to answer, the plaintiff obtained a
default judgment against that defendant. The plaintiff took no further
256. Id. at 607.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 608. See also Burke v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d
432 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); LeBlanc v. Thibodaux, 162 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1964).
259. Bryant, 288 So. 2d. at 609.
260. Id. at 609-10.
See also Bryant, 288 So. 2d at 611 n. 1, citing a line ofcases holding that
the abandonment article was inapplicable once a case had been submitted for
decision: Barton v. Burbank, 133 La. 997, 71 So. 134 (1916); Sanders v. Luke, 91
So. 2d 156 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); Landry v. Dore, 149 So. 321 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1933); Washington v. Harvey, 124 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) (After trial,
plaintiff submitted trial brief but defendants did not. Defendants' failure was not
chargeable to plaintiff, and the case was deemed to have been submitted on the
merits. Therefore, the abandonment article did not apply.).
See also Collins v. Methvin, 625 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993) (The
trial court erred in dismissing for abandonment of a suit which had been tried but
where the judgment was not signed until eight years later because the file was
missing. The abandonment article did not apply after the case was submitted for
decision and plaintiff could not be penalized for the court's delay in signing the
order ofjudgment.).
But compare with Putch v. Straughan, 397 So. 2d 38, 40 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1981), reh'gdenied,writdenied,401 So. 2d 976 (La. 1981) (Where case was tried
but continued for argument, it had not been submitted for decision. Plaintiff's
failure to request that the trial judge fix the date for argument within five years after
the continuance caused his suit to abandon by operation of law.).
261. Richey v. Fetty, 96-2762 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/98), 715 So. 2d 1.
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steps for over five years. The non-defaulted defendants filed a motion
to dismiss on grounds of abandonment. In opposition, the plaintiff
argued the case had been prosecuted to judgment as to one of the
solidary defendants. Therefore, the plaintiff argued that abandonment
was inapplicable to the case, including the remaining defendants.2 62
The defendants argued that abandonment would continue to apply as
long as the plaintiff had necessary steps in the prosecution of the case
to take against the remaining defendants. Otherwise, the litigation
could continue indefinitely, without plaintiffbeing required to take any
step, after obtaining a default judgment against one defendant. 26
The appellate court agreed with the defendants and reasoned that
once judgment has been rendered against one or more defendants in
one ofthe cumulated actions, the plaintiff's litigation right is merged
with the judgment and that action is removed from the remaining
cumulated actions.26" The appellate court found that, considering
Louisiana's liberal rules on cumulation of actions and joinder of
parties 26' and considering the purpose of the abandonment article to
hasten suits to judgment, it would be unreasonable to conclude that
ajudgment against one defendant in a cumulated action rendered the
266
rule of abandonment inapplicable as to the remaining defendants.
The defendants' position as solidary obligors made no difference.
The plaintiff could have sued each of the solidary defendants in
separate suits. A judgment in one suit would not preclude
abandonment in the other cases.26 7 The court held that the plaintiff
was obligated to take steps in the prosecution ofthe remaining actions
against the remaining defendants and failure to do so within five years
of the default judgment resulted in the abandonment of those
actions. 261
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in James v. Formosa
PlasticsCorp.Louisiana261 is consistent with the principle expressed
in Richey v. Fetty. In James, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id., 715 So. 2d at 3-4.
Id., 715 So. 2d at 4-5.
Id., 715 So. 2d at 6.
See Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So. 2d

1234, 1239 (La. 1993).

266. Richey, 96-2762 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/98), 715 So. 2d at 6.
267. Id., 715 So. 2d at 7. See also Tucker v. New Orleans Laundries, Inc., 145

So. 2d 365, 373 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (Dismissal byjudgment ofindispensable
party did not preclude plaintiff from taking further action against remaining

defendants pending appeal of the judgment. The fourth circuit stated: "We fail to
see how the rendition of a judgment against one defendant, followed by an appeal
to which other defendants are not parties, would prevent the plaintiff from
proceeding against another defendant in the case." Id.).
268. Richey, 96-2762 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/98), 715 So. 2d at 7.
269. James v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 01-2056 (La. 4/3/02), 813 So. 2d 335.
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a plaintiff was obligated to take steps in the trial court in the
prosecution of her case against Formosa Plastics Corporation
Louisiana even while her appeal against another defendant was
pending. The plaintiffs failure to do so caused her case against
Formosa to abandon.
VI. ABANDONMENT OF CUMULATED AcTIONS

James confirmed the principle of partial abandonment as first
stated Richey v. Fetty. Yet, Jamesalso resolved another important res
nova issue: whether the abandonment period was interrupted as to the
plaintiffs action against one defendant while the plaintiff was
pursuing the dismissal of a co-defendant on grounds of prescription
on appeal. Formosa's motion for dismissal was filed in the trial court
on June 1, 1999-over three years after any party had taken any
action in the trial court, including the filing of the plaintiff's motion
for devolutive appeal. Depositions taken in January 1996 were the
last actions taken by a party at the trial court level.
Meanwhile, the dismissal ofthe co-defendant was on appeal. The
First Circuit Court ofAppeal affirmed the dismissal by the trial court
on April 4, 1996. The plaintiff applied for a writ of certiorarito the
Louisiana Supreme Court on May 2, 1996 and the co-defendant filed
its opposition on May 17, 1996. The Louisiana Supreme Court
denied the writ on November 22, 1996. Thus, the only activity which
took place during the non-prosecution period was the Louisiana
Supreme Court's writ denial-an action taken by a court, not a party,
and an action taken at the appellate level, not the trial court level.
The trial court granted Formosa's motion for dismissal on
grounds ofabandonment. The First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed.
In a 3-2 decision and over vigorous dissent, the First Circuit held that
the three year abandonment period may not accrue as to one
defendant in a cumulated action while an appeal involving another
defendant is pending, even though no stay of the trial court
proceeding had issued.
In a unanimous decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.
The court relied on Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2088
and its clear explanation of the division of jurisdiction when an
appeal involving only one defendant in a multi-defendant lawsuit is
taken. The article provides that "[t]he jurisdiction of the trial court
over all matters in the case reviewable under the appeal is divested.
• ." and "the trial court has jurisdiction in the case only over those
matters not reviewable." Citing Walker v. Jones,270 the Louisiana
Supreme Court noted that the article expressly provided that the trial
270. Walker v. Jones, 257 La. 404, 242 So. 2d 559 (1970).
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court retained jurisdiction as to parties and issues which are not the
subject of the judgment on appeal.
The trial court's judgment granting the co-defendant's
prescription exception was the only issue on appeal. The judgment
did not involve the plaintiff's action against Formosa and, therefore,
that action remained before the trial court and remained subject to
abandonment. As emphasized by Justice Fitzsimmons in his
dissenting opinion to the first circuit opinion, just because an "action"
as to one defendant may be cumulated with an "action" as to another
does not mean that the two are forever inextricably entwined.27 '
VII. CONCLUSION

The history of the abandonment article may be traced from its
roots in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, through its transfer to the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure in1960, and finally to its current
form following its last amendment in 1997. The 1997 amendment
finally incorporated changes which had been recommended by legal
scholars for decades. The evolution of the abandonment article may
be traced through the hundreds of reported cases dating from the
article's inception in 1870 through the present day. The reported
cases all address some aspect of the article's interpretation or
application. Abandonment has been legislatively expanded from its
original application to plaintiffs to include all parties. Jurisprudential
exceptions to abandonment have been created which track those
created for prescription. The exceptions, based on the doctrines of
contranon valentem and acknowledgment, target both plaintiffs and
defendants. The abandonment period has been shortened from five
years to three years.
Steps deemed sufficient to interrupt
abandonment have been somewhat relaxed. Formal actions taken in
the trial court on the record are generally required to interrupt
abandonment; however, discovery authorized by the Code ofthe Civil
Procedure, though not filed into the record, will now suffice as well.
Despite all these changes, the core purpose underpinning the
original abandonment article remains constant even today-that once
a suit has been filed, it must not be allowed to linger indefinitely
without being moved toward final resolution. As in 1870, when the
principle ofabandonment was first created, today's plaintiffmust take
some step designed to hasten the suit to judgment within the time
period prescribed by law from the last step taken by any party in the
prosecution or defense of the suit. The test for whether abandonment
is interrupted is still whether the step taken demonstrates an intent not
271. James v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 00-0148 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/25/01), 808
So. 2d 572, 575.
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to treat the suit as abandoned. Although the abandonment article has
been the subject of several legislative amendments and a myriad of
interpretations and applications by the courts, the basic precept for
which the principle of abandonment was created and on which it is
grounded remains true today.

